Yes, you can use that Chinese company to manufacture your products and you may end up losing it all…

Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs

Wednesday, January 24, 2018

Chinese Company Sinovel Wind Group Convicted of Theft of Trade Secrets

A manufacturer and exporter of wind turbines based in the People’s Republic of China was convicted today of stealing trade secrets from AMSC, a U.S.-based company formerly known as American Superconductor Inc., announced Acting Assistant Attorney General John P. Cronan of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and U.S. Attorney Scott C. Blader for the Western District of Wisconsin.


Following an 11-day trial, a jury sitting in Madison, Wisconsin, convicted Sinovel Wind Group Co. Ltd., dba Sinovel Wind Group (USA) Co. Ltd. (Sinovel) of conspiracy to commit trade secret theft, theft of trade secrets, and wire fraud.  Sentencing is set for June 4.


“Sinovel nearly destroyed an American company by stealing its intellectual property,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Cronan.  “As today’s jury verdict demonstrates, this type of conduct, by any corporation – anywhere – is a crime, and won’t be tolerated.  The Department is dedicated to helping foster innovation and growth in our economy by deterring and punishing intellectual property theft from American companies.”


“Today’s verdict sends a strong and clear message that the theft of ideas and ingenuity is not a business dispute; it’s a crime and will be prosecuted as such,” said U.S. Attorney Blader.  “Sinovel’s illegal actions caused devastating harm to AMSC.  I commend the efforts of the investigation and prosecution team, and reaffirm the commitment of this office to protect American commerce and prosecute those who would seek to steal intellectual property.”


As proven at trial, Sinovel stole proprietary wind turbine technology from AMSC in order to produce its own turbines powered by the stolen intellectual property.  AMSC developed the technology – software that regulates the flow of electricity from wind turbines to electrical grids – in Wisconsin and elsewhere.  At the time of the theft in March 2011, Sinovel had contracted with AMSC for more than $800 million in products and services to be used for the wind turbines that Sinovel manufactured, sold, and serviced.


Sinovel was charged on June 27, 2013, along with Su Liying, the deputy director of Sinovel’s Research and Development Department; Zhao Haichun, a technology manager for Sinovel; and Dejan Karabasevic, a former employee of AMSC Windtec Gmbh, a wholly-owned subsidiary of AMSC.  The evidence presented at trial showed that Sinovel conspired with the other defendants to obtain AMSC’s copyrighted information and trade secrets in order to produce wind turbines and to retrofit existing wind turbines with AMSC technology without paying AMSC the more than $800 million it was owed and promised.  Through Su and Zhao, Sinovel convinced Karabasevic, who was head of AMSC Windtec’s automation engineering department in Klagenfurt, Austria, to leave AMSC Windtec, to join Sinovel, and to steal intellectual property from the AMSC computer system by secretly downloading source code on March 7, 2011, from an AMSC computer in Wisconsin to a computer in Klagenfurt.  Sinovel then commissioned several wind turbines in Massachusetts and copied into the turbines software compiled from the source code stolen from AMSC.  The U.S.-based builders of these Massachusetts turbines helped bring Sinovel to justice.  Su and Zhao are Chinese nationals living in China, and Karabasevic is a Serbian national who lived in Austria, but now lives in Serbia.


According to evidence presented at trial, following the theft, AMSC suffered severe financial hardship.  It lost more than $1 billion in shareholder equity and almost 700 jobs, over half its global workforce.


The case was investigated by the FBI’s Madison, Milwaukee, and Boston Offices; the FBI Legal Attachés’ Offices in Vienna, Austria and Beijing; the FBI Criminal Investigative Division; the FBI Intellectual Property Rights program; the Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Intelligence Service) and the Bundesministerium Fuer Justiz (Federal Ministry of Justice) in Austria; the Landeskriminalamt – Klagenfurt and the Staatsanwaltschaft – Klagenfurt (Criminal Investigative Police and State Prosecutor’s Office – Klagenfurt, Austria); and with the assistance of the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs and the Cybercrime Laboratory of the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS).


Senior Counsel Brian L. Levine of CCIPS and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Timothy M. O’Shea and Darren Halverson for the Western District of Wisconsin prosecuted the case, with substantial assistance from CCIPS Trial Attorney Joss Nichols and Digital Investigative Analyst Laura Peterson.


The Department of Justice’s Task Force on Intellectual Property (IP Task Force) contributed to this case.  The IP Task Force is led by the Deputy Attorney General to combat the growing number of domestic and intellectual property crimes, to protect the health and safety of American consumers, and to safeguard the nation’s economic security against those who seek to profit illegally from American creativity, innovation, and hard work.  To learn more about the IP Task Force, go to

Why did I leave Facebook?

I have been thinking about it for years, but never did.

Recently I received a tip that several facebook pages that fought the displacement of Americans by those using non-immigrant guest workers had been removed from facebook.

Sure enough, they were no longer available.

Which made me realize that eventually I would be next.

There is no sense building a platform to show people what is happening to American STEM workers knowing full well that eventually that platform will put an end to your work.

Which made me realize that I had been doing more and more posting on facebook, and less posting here at KAAW.

The solution was to end my use of facebook and focus on KAAW and my efforts at concernedSTEMworkers.


Dear John says the VA








This refers to the application you recently submitted to this office for the position below:

Position Title:   Housekeeping Aid Supervisor

Pay Plan:         WS



Vacancy ID:       2025317

Announcement Number:      VHA-671-18-LJW-2025317

Hiring Office:    Chief EMS

Results regarding your recent referral to the Hiring Official are as follows:

Referral Type:    Former employees eligible for reinstatement and current employees eligible for transfer without


Appointment Type:         Permanent

Specialty / Grade:        3566 – 02

Promotion Potential:


San Antonio, TX

Another candidate was selected for this position.

Audit Code:


Code Definition:

Not Selected

Code Explanation:

The selecting office has indicated that you were not selected for the position.

Thank you for your interest in Federal employment.  You are encouraged to visit to view additional Federal

employment opportunities and information.


For additional information, please refer to the vacancy announcement for this position.

Notice how nobody demands that Todd Schulte prove that he is one of the 86%?

Todd, you do NOT speak for me, and I don’t believe your polls at all.


Last night, a bipartisan group of Senators rejected a short-term spending bill that both failed to protect Dreamers, and provide a long-term budget for other critical needs, including domestic spending, and the military.

86% of Americans, including 79% of Republicans, favor permanent protections for Dreamers. But after months of kicking the can down the road, the January 19th deadline passed, and we are about to enter a period of massive chaos and uncertainty for nearly 800,000 DACA recipients and their families.

Share a message with everyone you know: I stand with Dreamers, and the shutdown cannot end without permanent protections for Dreamers.

Every day the shutdown continues without a solution for DACA devastates Dreamers, their families, their communities, and our economy.

Dreamers teach our children and care for our family members. They are leaders in our companies and brave members of our military. Starting very soon, 1,200 Dreamers will fall out of status each and every day, and face deportation to countries they have never known–unless Congress acts immediately.

Enough is enough. Republicans control the presidency, the House, and the Senate. There are bipartisan bills in the House and the Senate that could pass today. It’s time for them to come to the table, and make the deal the vast majority of Americans support.

The choice is crystal clear. Share your support for Dreamers right now.

Thank you,

Todd Schulte
President, FWD.Us

P.S. We created a new profile photo frame for you to show your support for Dreamers on Facebook. Add a the frame to your profile photo today.



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Xu, a Chinese national, is being held accountable for engaging in economic espionage against an American company

Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs

Thursday, January 18, 2018

Chinese National Sentenced for Economic Espionage and Theft of a Trade Secret From U.S. Company

Xu Jiaqiang, 31, formerly of Beijing, China, was sentenced yesterday to five years in prison, for economic espionage and theft of a trade secret in connection with Xu’s theft of proprietary source code from Xu’s former employer, with the intent to benefit the National Health and Family Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of China.  Xu previously pleaded guilty to all six counts with which he was charged.


Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security Dana J. Boente and U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman for the Southern District of New York made the announcement.  The sentence was imposed by U.S. District Judge Kenneth M. Karas in White Plains, New York federal court.


“Xu, a Chinese national, is being held accountable for engaging in economic espionage against an American company,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Boente. “Xu not only stole high tech trade secrets from his U.S. employer – a federal crime – he did so both for his own profit and intending to benefit the Chinese government.  Xu’s sentence clearly demonstrates that the National Security Division will not hesitate to pursue and prosecute those who steal from American businesses.  I thank the many people who worked hard to bring this result.”


“As he previously admitted in federal court, Xu Jiaqiang stole high-tech trade secrets from a U.S. employer, intending to benefit the Chinese government,” said U.S. Attorney Berman.  “The laws governing economic espionage and trade secrets exist, in part, to protect the sanctity of American ingenuity and property.  Xu’s prison sentence should be a red flag for anyone attempting to illegally peddle American expertize and intellectual property to foreign bidders.”


According to the allegations contained in the Complaint and the Superseding Indictment filed against Xu, as well as statements made in related court filings and proceedings:


From November 2010 to May 2014, Xu worked as a developer for a particular U.S. company (the Victim Company).  As a developer, Xu enjoyed access to certain proprietary software (the Proprietary Software), as well as that software’s underlying source code (the Proprietary Source Code).  The Proprietary Software is a clustered file system developed and marketed by the Victim Company in the United States and other countries.  A clustered file system facilitates faster computer performance by coordinating work among multiple servers.  The Victim Company takes significant precautions to protect the Proprietary Source Code as a trade secret.  Among other things, the Proprietary Source Code is stored behind a company firewall and can be accessed only by a small subset of the Victim Company’s employees.  Before receiving Proprietary Source Code access, Victim Company employees must first request and receive approval from a particular Victim Company official.  Victim Company employees must also agree in writing at both the outset and the conclusion of their employment that they will maintain the confidentiality of any proprietary information.  The Victim Company takes these and other precautions in part because the Proprietary Software and the Proprietary Source Code are economically valuable, which value depends in part on the Proprietary Source Code’s secrecy.


In May 2014, Xu voluntarily resigned from the Victim Company.  Xu subsequently communicated with one undercover law enforcement officer (UC-1), who posed as a financial investor aiming to start a large-data storage technology company, and another undercover law enforcement officer (UC-2), who posed as a project manager, working for UC-1.  In these communications, Xu discussed his past experience with the Victim Company and indicated that he had experience with the Proprietary Software and the Proprietary Source Code.  On March 6, 2015, Xu sent UC-1 and UC-2 a code, which Xu stated was a sample of Xu’s prior work with the Victim Company.  A Victim Company employee (Employee-1) later confirmed that the code sent by Xu included proprietary Victim Company material that related to the Proprietary Source Code.


Xu subsequently informed UC-2 that Xu was willing to consider providing UC-2’s company with the Proprietary Source Code as a platform for UC-2’s company to facilitate the development of its own data storage system.  Xu informed UC-2 that if UC-2 set up several computers as a small network, then Xu would remotely install the Proprietary Software so that UC-1 and UC-2 could test it and confirm its functionality.


In or around early August 2015, the FBI arranged for a computer network to be set up, consistent with Xu’s specifications.  Files were then remotely uploaded to the FBI-arranged computer network (the Xu Upload).  Thereafter, on or about Aug. 26, 2015, Xu and UC-2 confirmed that UC-2 had received the Xu Upload.  In September 2015, the FBI made the Xu Upload available to a Victim Company employee who has expertise regarding the Proprietary Software and the Proprietary Source Code (Employee-2).  Based on Employee-2’s analysis of technical features of the Xu Upload, it appeared to Employee-2 that the Xu Upload contained a functioning copy of the Proprietary Software.  It further appeared to Employee-2 that the Xu Upload had been built by someone with access to the Proprietary Source Code who was not working within the Victim Company or otherwise at the Victim Company’s direction.


On Dec. 7, 2015, Xu met with UC-2 at a hotel in White Plains, New York (the Hotel).  Xu stated, in sum and substance, that Xu had used the Proprietary Source Code to make software to sell to customers, that Xu knew the Proprietary Source Code to be the product of decades of work on the part of the Victim Company, and that Xu had used the Proprietary Source Code to build a copy of the Proprietary Software, which Xu had uploaded and installed on the UC Network (i.e., the Xu Upload).  Xu also indicated that Xu knew the copy of the Proprietary Software that Xu had installed on the UC Network contained information identifying the Proprietary Software as the Victim Company’s property, which could reveal the fact that the Proprietary Software had been built with the Proprietary Source Code without the Victim Company’s authorization.  Xu told UC-2 that Xu could take steps to prevent detection of the Proprietary Software’s origins – i.e., that it had been built with stolen Proprietary Source Code – including writing computer scripts that would modify the Proprietary Source Code to conceal its origins.


Later on Dec. 7, 2015, Xu met with UC-1 and UC-2 at the Hotel.  During that meeting, Xu showed UC-2 a copy of what Xu represented to be the Proprietary Source Code on Xu’s laptop.  Xu noted to UC-2 a portion of the code that indicated it originated with the Victim Company as well as the date on which it had been copyrighted.  Xu also stated that Xu had previously modified the Proprietary Source Code’s command interface to conceal the fact that the Proprietary Source Code originated with the Victim Company and identified multiple specific customers to whom Xu had previously provided the Proprietary Software using Xu’s stolen copy of the Proprietary Source Code.

*                *                *

 Mr. Boente and Mr. Berman praised the FBI’s outstanding investigative efforts.  Mr. Berman also thanked the U.S. Department of Justice’s National Security Division.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Benjamin Allee and Ilan Graff of the Southern District of New York, with assistance from Trial Attorney David Aaron of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, are in charge of the prosecution.

Counterintelligence and Export Control
Press Release Number: